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ABSTRACT
Designing security for grassroot movements raises several
challenges not particular to the organisations that conven-
tional approaches to security design cater for. Drawing on
analogies between Social Entrepreneurship and Grassroot
Activism, adopting an entrepreneurial approach to security
design may lead to security design decisions which are both
in-tune with a grassroot movement’s aims and cost effec-
tive. This position paper considers the applicability of Secu-
rity Entrepreneurship for security design in grassroot move-
ments. Using a SWOT analysis, we discuss the strengths
and weaknesses or this approach, before considering exter-
nal threats and opportunities arising its prolonged adoption.
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SECURING THE GRASSROOTS
Grassroot Activism raises two unique challenges for the de-
sign of security to protect its interests.
First, security design approaches are geared towards large,
well-funded organisations. In contrast to grassroot move-
ments, such organisations have the time and resources to pay
for dedicated security staff, and the supporting infrastructure
needed to ensure their interests remain protected as the or-
ganisation grows, and the environment around it changes.
Second, from their initial inception, some movements will
be construed as a threat. While security proponents argue
that security should be designed into any system from its in-
ception, it may be unrealistic to expect all nascent grassroot
movements to simultaneously think about their causes and
possible threats to their existence. Unfortunately, without
developing an appreciation of the threat landscape surround-
ing a movement, security decisions may be over or under-
commensurate to the risks it faces.
Many of the security problems faced by conventional organ-
isations arise because security is considered to be a product
that can be simply purchased and bolted-on to an organi-
sational infrastructure. Moreover, when security chafes the
ability of staff to be innovative, attempts will be made to cir-
cumvent security. The knee-jerk reaction of security admin-
istrators in such instances is to treat users as miscreants. The
negative impact this can have on morale and productivity in
commercial organisations is damaging, but not fatal. At a
grassroot level, however, such behaviour could de-motivate
volunteer activists from contributing to a movement alto-
gether.
As Bruce Schneier states, security is a “process rather than a
product” [10], and configuring this process for any organisa-
tion involves more than simply installing software on a PC
or a network server. However, there are no obvious solutions
for what such a process might look like for small, grassroot
movements. Moreover, what might be a reasonable security
strategy for one movement might be completely inappropri-
ate for the problems faced by another.
FROM ACTIVISM TO SECURITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Previous work [11, 5] has linked Grassroot Activism with
Social Entrepreneurship, although, as Stryjan [11] notes, these
analogies may not be immediately obvious. A succinct defi-
nition for what Social Entrepreneurship is eludes us; Nicholls
suggests that this might be the basis of its success, in that
Social Entrepreneurs will exploit a variety of different tools
and techniques to maximise the creation of social value [8].
In a talk given at Oxford last year, serial entrepreneur Jerry
Sanders stated that entrepreneurs were successful because
they “sell the dream”. However, fostering innovation is also
a system integration problem, and many elements in a social
system need to be configured and re-configured if ideas are
to have impact, and social capital is to be created.
Recent work has examined how the principles of Social En-
trepreneurship can be used to design innovative security so-
lutions. This has led to the new paradigm of Security En-
trepreneurship: the application of innovation models and
principles to organise, create, and manage security design
elements to bring about improved system security [3]. This
work is motivated by the observation that situating security
attuned to the physical and social contexts it needs to operate
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Figure 1. Site Authenticationware Chindo¯gu
in is akin to solving a wicked problem [9]; this is because of
the lack of clarity about what it means to secure a system, or
even test that a system is secure. We have specifically drawn
three analogies between Security and Social Entrepreneur-
ship:
• Both approaches deal with problems with a social context.
• The value propositions nurtured by both approaches are
designed to empower under-served or neglected commu-
nities.
• The success of both innovations is marked when tradi-
tional organisations attempt to enter the hitherto ignored
market.
SWOT ANALYSIS
To examine the applicability of Security Entrepreneurship to
security design for Grassroot Activism, we have carried out
a SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats)
analysis of this position. We first consider the strengths and
weaknesses associated with adopting this approach, before
discussing possible external opportunities and threats asso-
ciated with its prolonged adoption.
Strengths
Security Entrepreneurship is built on Technology and So-
cial Entrepreneurship principles, many of which underpin
the growth philosophy of grassroot movements. Many suc-
cessful innovation models can be repurposed, leading to in-
novative security which can be both situated to the needs
of the movement and are cost-effective. In [3], we demon-
strated how existing work on Social Network Theory can be
used to re-configure the social network in an organisation to
optimise the flow of information in a particular security ac-
tivity. We also showed how Value-added Chains could be
used to model how disruptive security controls might be to
different stakeholders on a project.
We have also found that Security Entrepreneurship can in-
form security design using techniques from the HCI vernac-
ular. In a recent case study, we discovered design criteria
for security controls in water-treatment plants based on ob-
servational data, and artifacts commonly found in the en-
vironment where the controls would need to be situated in.
These artifacts were used to fashion a Chindo¯gu: an inge-
nious gadget which may seem like an ideal solution to a
problem, but introduces so many new problems that it ef-
fectively has no utility [6]. Figure 1 (left) illustrates the Site
Authenticationware Chindo¯gu we developed as a “solution”
to the problem of unusable two-factor authentication. Us-
ing the literary device of Defamiliarisation [2], we uncov-
ered the affordances of the Chindo¯gu using an ontology chart
(Figure 1 (right)) and discovered vulnerabilities which might
arise when building controls for this environment. These
insights led to innovative usability design criteria for secu-
rity controls that would make them usable by plant operators
and technicians. Our rationale for developing a control as a
Chindo¯gu rather than a more useful prototype is that building
an artifact which looks useful but is deliberately designed to
be useless is unorthodox to most engineers, and demands
creative thinking. Breaking from conventional orthodoxy is
useful for viewing the artifact from an unfamiliar standpoint.
Weaknesses
While Security Entrepreneurship can complement participa-
tory design approaches, it is more contingent on the role of
the entrepreneur than participatory approaches are on the
role of the facilitator. Similarly, while traditional design
leads might be focused on conceptual integrity, the entrepreneur
is opportunity-centered. Specifically, the Security Entrepreneur
is looking for opportunities for system insecurity, before ex-
ploring solutions for dealing with them, and re-configuring
the system to remove the insecurity. Indeed, [3] suggests
that what distinguishes the entrepreneur from other design
roles is that, rather than working within the confines of a
particular scope, an entrepreneur is prepared to re-configure
the world around him to ensure the environment shapes a de-
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sign, rather than vice-versa. Although this mind-set is eman-
cipatory and makes the design of security a pro-active rather
than re-active process, it is also unorthodox and, therefore, a
possible cause of contention during the design process.
A further weakness relates to the Security Entrepreneur’s
role as an agent of change. [3] suggests that the disruptive
innovation these entrepreneurs generate may lead to an in-
novation design dilemma, where the diversity caused by ap-
plying innovation techniques leads to conflict that hampers
the implementation of the innovation [4]. For this reason,
we need to consider how suitable different grassroot organi-
sations might be as a context for this kind of intervention.
Opportunities
From a research perspective, Security Entrepreneurship at a
grassroot level may lead to important insights into how secu-
rity can be better designed. Because grassroot organisations
have fewer resources than most organisations for designing
security, it is precisely the eco-system that can stimulate in-
ventive ideas for solving common security problems. By ap-
plying Security Entrepreneurship techniques, we can better
understand what sort of environmental changes are needed
to make sure these ideas have impact.
For security research, disseminating innovation arising from
Security Entrepreneurship interventions would be analogous
to social innovation in the developing work leading to new
insights into Social Entrepreneurship theory. For example,
Leadbeater’s theory of Structured Self-Organisation [7] was
inspired by successful city-wide waste recycling and city
planning social enterprises in Curitiba, Brazil. These en-
terprises relied on values such as collaborative engagement
and a pragmatic working philosophy. These values are not
incompatible with grassroot movements, nor are they incom-
patible with the design of security.
Threats
Without applying Security Entrepreneurship in practice, we
can only speculate what threats might arise to grassroot move-
ments by adopting this approach. One particular threat, how-
ever, arises from the notion of the Security Entrepreneur as
a potential inside-attacker. In particular, what happens if a
Security Entrepreneur decides to leave a movement and join
another organisation with non-complementary aims?
From a security perspective, this could lead to disaster as
the entrepreneur’s privileged knowledge, coupled with his
innate ability to shape the environment, could lead to new
innovations which might harm the movement. Moreover, a
Security Entrepreneur may deliberately use innovation mod-
els and techniques to scare other members of a movement
into making sub-optimal security decisions that benefit him
in the future. Conversely, however, treating the entrepreneur
as an outsider and gatekeeping his activities breeds an atmo-
sphere of distrust, and stifles the spirit of innovation.
Because there is no easy solution for mitigating this threat,
how Security Entrepreneurship might be used should be care-
fully considered before it is applied. For this reason, [3]
proposes that Security Entrepreneurship should be evaluated
within the context of Action Research interventions [1]. This
ensures that a mutually accessible framework can be agreed
between the movement benefiting from the intervention, and
the researcher fulfilling the role of a Security Entrepreneur.
Moreover, the intervention also provides useful results about
other threats the movement might be exposed to by this ap-
proach.
CONCLUSION
Grassroot movements face a number of unique security prob-
lems that conventional approaches to organisational security
are unable to deal with. Drawing on the analogies between
Grassroot Activism and Social Entrepreneurship, this paper
has proposed Security Entrepreneurship as a security design
paradigm for such groups. To explore its applicability at a
grassroot level, we have examined Security Entrepreneur-
ship’s strengths and weaknesses, and discussed consequen-
tial opportunities and threats arising from prolonged use of
this approach.
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